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Abstract
Background: In October 2009, the first case of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 (pH1N1) was confirmed in Kigali, Rwanda
and countrywide dissemination occurred within several weeks. We describe clinical and epidemiological characteristics of
this epidemic.
Methods: From October 2009 through May 2010, we undertook epidemiologic investigations and response to pH1N1.
Respiratory specimens were collected from all patients meeting the WHO case definition for pH1N1, which were tested
using CDC’s real time RT-PCR protocol at the Rwandan National Reference Laboratory (NRL). Following documented viral
transmission in the community, testing focused on clinically severe and high-risk group suspect cases.
Results: From October 9, 2009 through May 31, 2010, NRL tested 2,045 specimens. In total, 26% (n=532) of specimens
tested influenza positive; of these 96% (n=510) were influenza A and 4% (n=22) were influenza B. Of cases testing
influenza A positive, 96.8% (n=494), 3% (n=15), and 0.2% (n=1) were A(H1N1)pdm09, Seasonal A(H3) and Seasonal A(non-
subtyped), respectively. Among laboratory-confirmed cases, 263 (53.2%) were children ,15 years and 275 (52%) were
female. In total, 58 (12%) cases were hospitalized with mean duration of hospitalization of 5 days (Range: 2–15 days). All
cases recovered and there were no deaths. Overall, 339 (68%) confirmed cases received oseltamivir in any setting. Among all
positive cases, 26.9% (143/532) were among groups known to be at high risk of influenza-associated complications,
including age ,5 years 23% (122/532), asthma 0.8% (4/532), cardiac disease 1.5% (8/532), pregnancy 0.6% (3/532), diabetes
mellitus 0.4% (2/532), and chronic malnutrition 0.8% (4/532).
Conclusions: Rwanda experienced a PH1N1 outbreak which was epidemiologically similar to PH1N1 outbreaks in the
region. Unlike seasonal influenza, children ,15 years were the most affected by pH1N1. Lessons learned from the outbreak
response included the need to strengthen integrated disease surveillance, develop laboratory contingency plans, and
evaluate the influenza sentinel surveillance system.
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Introduction
Rwanda is a landlocked, low-income country, situated in East
Africa with an estimated 2010 population of 10.4 million. With
350 people per km
2, it is the most densely populated country in
Africa. It is estimated that 57.5% of the population is below 20
years of age. Females account for 52.3% of the population with an
average life expectancy of 53.3 years compared to 49.4 years for
males [1]. Rwanda has an equatorial climate with moderate
temperatures and two rainy seasons, from March through June
and from October through December [2].
Prior to the onset of the 2009 Pandemic Influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 (pH1N1) in North America, the Rwandan
Ministry of Health (MOH) in collaboration with the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention established an influenza
sentinel surveillance system (ISS) in July 2008 to understand the
epidemiology of seasonal influenza and monitor for the emergence
of a novel influenza strain with pandemic potential. Since the
occurrence of the outbreak of pH1N1 in Mexico in April 2009, the
MOH developed a pandemic operational plan in order to
minimize the impacts of the pandemic [3–5]. After initial cases
of A(H1N1)pdm09 were reported in Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda in June and July, 2009 respectively [6,7], the MOH
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test the preparedness and readiness of the country to respond to
the pandemic.
In Rwanda, the first case was identified in early October 2009
as a 42 year old female Rwandan who traveled back to Kigali after
a short visit to the US. She presented without symptoms at the
airport and developed an influenza-like illness (ILI) on October 4,
2009. Two of her children attending primary school fell ill on
October 6 and 7, 2009. Healthcare providers at.
Hospital A, a tertiary referral facility in Kigali where the index
case and her children had sought treatment became ill October 8,
2009. Samples collected on October 8, 2009 from the index case
tested positive for pH1N1 virus by real time reverse transcriptase
(rRT-PCR) at the National Reference Laboratory (NRL). The
result was communicated by the MOH to the public on October
9, 2009.
Following this first laboratory confirmed case, the MOH
established an inter-agency.
Multidisciplinary Emergency Working Group (EWG) to lead
the outbreak investigation and response. We describe the clinical
and epidemiological characteristics of this outbreak and response
in Rwanda from October 2009 through May 2010.
Methods
Influenza Sentinel Surveillance Sites
Since July 2008, an influenza sentinel surveillance system (ISS)
had been established in six public hospitals (Figure 1), including
two referral and four district hospitals. One referral hospital and
one district hospital were located in the capital city of Kigali while
three district hospitals and one referral hospital were located in the
country’s other four provinces. The catchment area of each district
hospital was approximately three hundred thousand persons, while
the catchment area of the referral hospitals was the entire country.
The selection was contingent upon the site’s capacity to collect and
ship samples to the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) in
Kigali and the site’s interest to participate in the ISS program.
Each hospital had pediatric and adult inpatient wards as well as
ambulatory care services, all of which participated in the
surveillance program.
The ISS systematically identified Influenza-Like-Illness (ILI)
and Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI) cases at the selected
sentinel sites from July 2008 to September 2009, according to the
World Health Organization (WHO) case definitions. An ILI case
was defined as an outpatient with fever ($38uC) and cough or sore
throat in absence of specific diagnosis with the onset of symptoms
less than three days. A SARI case in ‘‘adults’’ was defined as a
hospitalized patient 5 years and above with fever ($38uC), cough,
and shortness of breath or difficulty breathing with the onset of
symptoms less than seven days. A SARI case in children was
defined as a hospitalized patient 2 months to less than 5 years old,
with cough or difficulty breathing, and at least one respiratory
danger sign (unable to drink or breastfeed, lethargic, vomits
everything, convulsions, nasal flaring, grunting, oxygen saturation
,90%, chest indrawing, stridor in a calm child, tachypnea) with
onset of symptoms less than seven days.
All eligible SARI cases in inpatient wards and the first two ILI
cases per day from outpatients ward were included in the
surveillance. Children aged less than 2 months were excluded.
For each enrolled SARI and ILI case, a questionnaire was
completed that included demographic, clinical, and epidemiolog-
ical information. In addition, a nasopharyngeal (NP) and
oropharyngeal (OP) sample were collected by a trained nurse/
laboratory technician. Swabs were placed in cryovials with 1 ml of
viral transport media (VTM) and stored at 4uC for a maximum of
72 hours until they could be shipped to the NRL. At the NRL,
RNA extractions were performed on specimens prior to freezing at
270uC using the QI Aamp Viral RNA Isolation Kit (QIAGEN,
Valencia, CA, USA). Extracted RNA was amplified using Access
RT-PCR System (Promega, Madison, WI, USA). Specimens were
tested by real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
(rRT-PCR) for presence of influenza A and B viruses using
standard rRT-PCR procedures [3–5].
Surveillance during the Containment Phase of the pH1N1
Outbreak Response
After the index case of pH1N1 was identified, the Emergency
Working Group (EWG) revised the World Health Organization
(WHO) case definitions for SARI and ILI in use at sentinel sites to
include risk factors for pH1N1. The EWG also updated existing
case investigation forms for enhanced ILI and SARI surveillance
at sentinel and non-sentinel hospitals, and developed new data
collection tools for outbreak investigation including a line list,
pH1N1 contact monitoring form, and laboratory testing register.
On October 10
th, 2009, the EWG began contact tracing to
monitor for ILI and development of SARI symptoms in
households of laboratory confirmed cases, schools attended by
the index case’s children, the offices where the index case worked,
Hospital A, where the index case had been treated, as well as
among airplane passengers who traveled on the same flight as the
index case. A contact was defined as a person who had close
contact (within one meter) with a laboratory-confirmed case at any
time during illness. A laboratory-confirmed case of pH1N1 virus
infection was defined as a person with an acute febrile respiratory
illness with laboratory confirmed non-seasonal influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection by real-time reverse transcrip-
tase–polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) at the NRL.
As part of contact tracing, a suspected case of pH1N1 was
defined as any contact meeting WHO ILI or SARI case definitions
with onset of symptoms within 7 days of close contact with a
laboratory confirmed case of pH1N1 virus infection. All suspect
pH1N1 cases had nasopharyngeal (NP) and/or oropharyngeal
(OP) swabs taken by the laboratory technician of the outbreak
investigation team. Specimens were then tested for pH1N1 and
other influenza types and subtypes at the National Reference
Laboratory using rRT-PCR assay based on the 2009 CDC
guidelines for detection of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus using ABI 7500
Standard (Applied Biosystems Incorporation) [8].
Specimens were processed in batches of 24 specimens with a
turnaround time of 12–24 hours. External quality assurance was
provided by the Kenya Medical Research Institute-CDC labora-
tory in Nairobi, Kenya. Gradually, as the laboratory diagnosed
new confirmed pH1N1 cases, new contact lists were established by
the EWG in Kigali City. This practice was discontinued when the
transmission generation was unknown and community transmis-
sion appeared widespread. On October 27, 2009, a foreign
national residing in Gisenyi city in the Western Province of
Rwanda and who recently arrived to Rwanda from the US
developed an ILI. Samples collected from this case tested positive
for pH1N1 virus infection on October 30
th, 2009. This was the
first laboratory-confirmed case outside of Kigali that was not
epidemiologically linked to known cases or their contacts.
On November 6, 2011, pH1N1 positivity was confirmed among
two foreign nationals attending solidarity camps in Muhanga
District, South province. They arrived in Rwanda on November
1
t, 2011 from Europe, also considered the external setting of likely
transmission.
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their contacts, or with history of external travel, were increasingly
documented across the country, indicating widespread community
transmission of pH1N1. Thus, on November 16, 2009, the EWG
decided to transition from the initial containment phase to a
mitigation phase. The containment phase lasted until November
16, 2009 and was characterized by intensive contact tracing,
laboratory testing of suspect cases, mass communication, oselta-
vimir (TamifluH) distribution to suspect and laboratory-confirmed
cases, and school closure [9–12].
Surveillance during the Mitigation Phase of the pH1N1
Outbreak Response
Mitigation phase activities included decentralization of outbreak
management to all 30 district hospitals, targeted laboratory testing
of suspect pH1N1 cases, restrictive use of oseltamivir for most at
risk laboratory-confirmed cases only, and enhanced surveillance.
In the context of community transmission of pH1N1 in the
country, an increase in new cases of suspect pH1N1 was expected.
With the limited laboratory capacity, NRL would not be able to
test every suspect case. In view of these limitations, the EWG
advised on the following and proposed an A(H1N1)pdm09
Laboratory testing algorithm (Figure 2);
Figure 1. Location of Influenza Surveillance Sentinel sites and documented pH1N1 virus spread in Rwanda. From October 2009 - May
2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031572.g001
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doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031572.g002
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tested. In a district where pH1N1 transmission had not previously
been confirmed, about 1–5% of the suspected cases in a cluster
had specimens collected from the severely sick (with a maximum of
10 samples from the biggest cluster) and all the others were line-
listed as possible cases.
2. If a suspect case was severely ill or in a high-risk group, i.e.
pregnant women, chronic respiratory problems (e.g. asthma,
chronic bronchitis, cardiac problems, HIV/AIDS, cancer patients,
diabetic, ,5 yrs old) a specimen was taken.
3. Not all cases of pH1N1 required oseltamivir; treatment was
given only to the severe cases and those at high risk of
complications e.g. pregnant women, children under 5 years or
those with an underlying medical condition like diabetes, asthma,
heart disease, lung disease, or immuno-compromising illness. No
prophylaxis with oseltamivir was recommended in any circum-
stances.
4. Due to community transmission of influenza A/H1N1 the
EWG recommended community management and home based
care of suspect mild cases of pH1N1. Thus, only severe cases were
admitted, and. all other cases were managed conservatively as for
seasonal influenza.
5. There was inadequate rationale and capacity for mass
screening of institutions/schools for pH1N1, but in institutions
where suspect cases occurred for the first time, a few specimens
(not to exceed ten) were taken for testing.
Data Analysis
Epi-Info version 3.5.1 (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia) and Intercooled StataH (StataCorp
LP, College Station, Texas) were used to analyse the surveillance
data. Outbreak investigation data were analyzed in Excel.
Demographic, clinical and epidemiological characteristics of
influenza cases between inter-pandemic and pandemic periods
and the characteristics of positive and negative cases and virus
circulation during the pandemic period in Rwanda from July 2008
to May 2010 were analyzed.
Ethics Statement
The outbreak investigation and response conformed to the
Helsinki Declaration and to local legislation. The activity was
deemed non-research by the Rwanda National Ethics Committee
and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Results
Sentinel Surveillance of Influenza Prior to the Pandemic
From July 2008 to September 2009, a total of 659 respiratory
specimens were tested, of which 297 (45.1%) were ILI and 362
(54.9%) were SARI cases. Among SARI cases, 30.7% (111/362)
were SARI Adult and 69.3% (251/362) were SARI Child cases.
The ratio of females to males was 1.4 for ILI cases and 0.98 for
SARI cases. The median age was 21.6 years (range: 2 mo–68.8
years) for ILI cases, 30.7 year (range: 5–93.6 years) for SARI adult
cases, and 1.0 year (range: 2 mo–4.96 years) for SARI child cases.
The overall proportion of influenza positive was 10.8% (71/659)
with 12.1% (36/297); 18.9% (21/111) and 5.6% (14/251) for ILI,
SARI Adult and SARI child cases, respectively. The proportion of
influenza positive cases was similar in 15–49 years (46.5%) and
,15 years (44.9%) age groups (Table 1).
Of all influenza cases detected during the surveillance period,
56.3% (N=40) were type A and 43.7% (N=31) were influenza B
viruses. The monthly trends of influenza activity revealed that the
majority of influenza in 2008 season (July-December) was caused
by Influenza A(H3) viruses. In 2009 season (January-December),
initially, influenza A(H3) viruses predominated with some co-
circulation of Influenza A(H1) and B viruses, but since October, A
(H1N1) pdm09 largely predominated over other influenza viruses
with limited co-circulation of influenza A(H3) and Influenza B
(Figure 3).
Pandemic Period
From October 9, 2009 to May31, 2010, 2,045 nasopharyngeal
and oro-pharyngeal specimens were submitted to the NRL for
testing. Of these, 69.7% (n=1426) were ILI, 9.3% (n=191) were
SARI Adult and 21% (n=428) were SARI Child cases. In total,
26% (n=532) of specimens tested positive for influenza. Of these
96% (n=510) were influenza A and 4% (n=22) were influenza B.
Of cases testing positive for influenza A, 96.8% (n=494); 3%
(n=15) and 0.2% (n=1) were A(H1N1)pdm09, Seasonal A(H3)
and Seasonal A(Unsubtyped) respectively). The percentage of
confirmed influenza cases due to A(H1N1)pdm09 was highest in
the age group of ,15 years (53.2%) compared with other groups
(Tables 1 and 2).
Among all influenza positive cases during the pandemic period,
26.9% (143/532) were among groups known to be at high risk of
influenza-associated complications, including age ,5 years (23%)
and chronic breathing problems (31.4%) (Table 1).
Among all positive influenza cases, the most common symptoms
at illness onset were cough (88.2%), fever (85.2%), headache
(71.8%), lethargy (69.7%), sore throat (57.9%) followed by
difficulty breathing (32.5%), muscle pain (32.3%), dizziness
(30.1%), nausea (27.6%), vomiting (16.7%) and diarrhea 8.3%
(Table 3). The median duration between onset of symptoms and
health facility presentation of laboratory confirmed cases was three
days (Range: 1–14 days) versus three days (range: 1–21 days) for
influenza negative cases. In total, 85% of patients presented within
seven days of illness onset.
In total, 58 (12%) cases were hospitalized with mean duration of
hospitalization of five days (Range: 2–15 days) and all cases
recovered. Overall, 339 (68.6%) laboratory-confirmed cases
received oseltamivir in all healthcare settings as curative and
preventive treatment. On October 31, 2009 and November 6,
2009, the second and third index cases were confirmed outside of
Kigali. As of May 31, 2010, transmission of pH1N1 had been
confirmed in 19 of 30 administrative districts in Rwanda and in all
5 provinces. Nine districts with the greatest number of cases
accounted for over 92% of all confirmed cases. Six of these districts
are home to sentinel sites and one is in Kigali City; the two other
districts are more remote and in proximity to major border
crossings with Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Presumptive transmission settings included: households (76.1%,
376/494), schools (41.7%, 206/494), and health facilities (10.1%,
50/494), prisons (5%, 24/494), solidarity camps (0.4%, 2/494)
and foreign countries (1.2%, 6/494).
Attack rates of laboratory-confirmed cases during the contain-
ment phase ranged from 2.4% (42/1,750) to 3.8% (22/584) in
schools and 1.6% (10/617) in the health facility attended by the
index case. The proportion of cases originating from districts with
sentinel sites was two-fold higher than those from non-sentinel site
districts. The share from sentinel sites increased from 65% to 75%
of all positive cases from containment to mitigation phase, while it
decreased from 35 to 25% in non-sentinel site Districts (Table 4).
Discussion
The A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak occurred in Rwanda at the
beginning of the normal influenza season period and three months
2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in Rwanda
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(Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda). Prior to the outbreak, any increased
influenza activity in the surveillance system could have identified
the outbreak. Instead, the index case was detected in a non-
sentinel hospital, suggesting that sentinel surveillance may not be
the best system to promptly detect the first case. The trigger of
outbreak detection was the guidance provided by the Ministry of
Health to the index case to seek care, and have nasopharyngeal
and oropharyngeal swabs taken and tested for A(H1N1)pdm09
virus infection.
Following the initial pH1N1 detection, control measures such as
airport screening of incoming passengers, promotion of hand
hygiene, use of facial mask, and self-isolation of laboratory-
confirmed cases were implemented at the beginning of the
outbreak. However, these measures did not prevent the spread
of pH1N1 in the general population. The containment phase
investigation documented at least two additional likely introduc-
tions of pH1N1 to Rwanda; these laboratory-confirmed cases
likely acquired infection from external settings. Moreover, the
virus spread among children was related to school and social
contact of the index case’s children with classmates and other
students in Kigali. Having children at home and contact with a
patient with a similar illness were the exposures more frequently
identified among laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 cases compared to
seasonal influenza patients (p,0.0001).
As mentioned earlier, during the pH1N1 outbreak the age
group,15 years old had the highest proportion (53.2%) of
influenza positive cases compared to the inter-pandemic period
(44.6%). This is probably due to the demographic structure of
Rwandan where more than 45.9% are ,15 years [1,2]. The
pandemic strain has co-circulated with seasonal A(H3) and
influenza B; but seasonal A(H1) has no longer circulated since
the detection of A(H1N1)pdm09 (Figure 3).
During the shift from containment to mitigation phase,
laboratory sampling methods were changed to selectively target
most at risk and severely ill cases. Thus, a higher proportion of
laboratory-confirmed influenza was expected during the mitiga-
tion phase. Instead, a slightly lower proportion 223.4% (218/931)
- was reported compared with 24.7% (276/1114) –during the
containment phase. The mitigation strategies implemented during
the containment phase such as school closure and systematic
distribution of oseltamivir to all suspect and laboratory confirmed
cases may have helped to reduce viral transmission. It is also
possible that the mitigation phase took place when the most
susceptible population had already been exposed, and the rates in
the general population had begun to decline.
Overall, disease severity was relatively mild with 70% of cases
classified as ILI, 12% hospitalized, and no deaths. These findings
are consistent with other reports from the region and internation-
ally [8,9,13–15]. Our findings demonstrated that clinical symp-
Table 1. Demographic and epidemiological characteristics of influenza cases in Rwanda from July 2008– May 2010.
Parameters
Influenza positive during inter-pandemic
Period (n=659) n (%)
Influenza positive during pandemic
period (n=2045) n (%) p-value
Age
Median (Range) 21.1y (3mo–93y) 19.4y (5mo–62y) NS
,6months 4 (5.6) 19 (3.6) ,0.001
6–23 months 13 (18.3) 49 (9.2)
24–59 months 3 (4.3) 54 (10.2)
5–14 years 13 (18.3) 141 (26.5)
15–49 years 33 (46.5) 257 (48.3)
50–64 years 4 (5.6) 10 (1.8)
$65 years 1 (1.4) 2 (0.4)
Sex
Female 36 (50.7) 275 (51.7) 0.06
Co-morbid conditions
Asthma 1 (1.4) 4 (0.8) ,0.001
Chronic breathing problems 3 (4.2) 167 (31.4)
Chronic cough 0 (0.0) 3 (0.6)
Cardiac disease 3 (4.2) 8 (1.5)
Recurrent chest pain 3 (4.2) 1 (0.2)
Chronic malaria 0 (.0) 3 (0.6)
Diabetes 0 (0.0) 2 (0.4)
Chronic malnutrition 0 (0.0) 4 (0.8)
Other
Pregnant 1 (1.4) 3 (0.6) ,0.001
Office worker 0 (0.0) 28 (5.3)
Student 0 (0.0) 206 (38.7)
Children at home 13 (18.3) 235 (44.2)
Contact with a similar illness in last 3 weeks 2 (2.8) 116 (21.8)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031572.t001
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Table 2. Distribution of influenza type and subtypes by age group during pandemic period in Rwanda from October 2009– May
2010.
Influenza ,6 mo 6–23 mo 24–59 mo 5–14 y 15–49 y 50–64 y .=65 y Total
A(H1N1)pdm09 19 38 51 139 237 8 2 494
A / H 3 02101 0 201 5
A / U n s u b t y p e d 00010001
B 09211 0 002 2
Total 19 49 54 141 257 10 2 532
Percent 3.6 9.2 10.2 26.5 48.3 1.8 0.4 100
mo = months; y = year.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031572.t002
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has been described for normal seasonal influenza illness [14]. We
identified lower proportions of diarrhea (8.3% vs. 37%) and
vomiting (16.7% vs.41%) compared to hospitalized pH1N1
patients in Kenya [15]. Symptoms significantly associated with
A(H1N1)pdm09 positive cases versus negative cases were fever,
cough, sore throat, nausea and muscle pain (p,0.0001).
Although Rwanda received 15,000 treatment courses of
oseltamivir from WHO, this drug was used sparingly during the
pandemic period to avoid drug resistance as the outbreak was
considered to be a mild disease. Our attack rates were limited by
the fact that they were only calculated within circumscribed
communities (i.e.: schools, prisons) where it was possible to obtain
denominator data. These attack rates are below the cumulative
attack rate of 7.7% among all age groups in Lima, Peru [13], of
14.7% in Chicago among children aged 5–14 years [16] and of
43.4% in a community cohort study involving persons aged 5–14
years in Hong Kong [17].
Districts with influenza sentinel sites accounted for 69% of all
positive confirmed cases and the share from the sentinel sites
increased substantially from containment to mitigation phase
(Table 3). These numbers demonstrated that the sentinel
surveillance system served as the driving force behind the detection
and sample collection of new cases of pH1N1. However, the lack
of reporting from non-sentinel sites and districts also showed that
the decentralized district hospital-driven strategy envisioned
during the tabletop exercise was not fully realized. Although an
initial attempt was made during the transition from containment
to mitigation phases to train district hospitals on outbreak
surveillance and management, the limited reporting reinforced
the need to improve the functioning of influenza rapid response
teams at the district level.
Our study has some limitations. We used different methods
during containment (contact tracing and systematic testing) and
mitigation phases (targeted testing) to identify cases and this may
have introduced biases that reduce the representativeness of the
findings with respect to the general population. The reported cases
were limited to the hospitals where influenza surveillance is
conducted and in hospitals where clinicians conducted systematic
surveillance for pH1N1. Thus, additional cases of pH1N1 may
have been missed at other health facilities and thus were not
reflected in this report. Lastly, sentinel surveillance of influenza
Table 3. Clinical characteristics of positive and negative influenza cases during pandemic period in Rwanda from October 2009–
May 2010.
Parameters Influenza negative n (%) Influenza positive n (%) p-value
N (%) 1513 (74.0) 532 (26.0%)
Reported symptoms
Fever 1122 (74.2) 453 (85.2) ,0.001
Cough 1244 (82.2) 469 (88.2)
Nausea 229 (15.1) 147 (27.6)
Vomiting 297 (19.6) 89 (16.7)
Headache 713 (47.1) 382 (71.8)
Diarrhea 139 (9.2) 44 (8.3)
Lethargy 925 (61.1) 371 (69.7)
Difficulty breathing 678 (44.8) 173 (32.5)
Muscle pain 245 (16.2) 172 (32.3)
Dizziness 247 (16.3) 160 (30.1)
Sore throat 680 (45.0) 308 (57.9)
Symptom duration relative to presentation in days
Median days (Range) 3 (1–21) 3 (1–14) ,0.001
0–3days 803 (53.1) 297 (55.8)
4–7days 485 (32.1) 158 (29.7)
.7days 44 (2.9) 11 (2.1)
Vital signs
Median uC Temperature (Range) 38.2uC(37–41.6) 38uC (36.9–40)
Median admission pulse oximetry (Range) 97(85–100) 98(88–100)
Median breathing frequency (Range) 32(15–72) 24(16–70)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031572.t003
Table 4. Laboratory-confirmed A (H1N1) pdm09 by response
phase and collection site in Rwanda from October 2009– May
2010.
Collection site Containment Mitigation Total
# (%) # (%) # (%)
Sentinel Site Districts* 178 (64.5) 163 (75) 341(69)
Non-Sentinel Site Districts
698 (35.5) 55 (25) 153(31)
Total 276 (100) 218 (100) 494 (100)
*n=6; Districts with an ISS site;
6n=24; Districts without an ISS site.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031572.t004
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epidemiology and burden of disease to allow appropriate
comparison with pandemic data (Table 1).
This study describes the epidemiology, clinical features, and the
response to the outbreak of Influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 in Rwanda
from October 2009 to May 2010. The outbreak occurred and
peaked during the influenza season in Rwanda. Unlike seasonal
influenza, children,15 years were the most affected. Our findings
demonstrate that clinical symptoms and duration for
A(H1N1pdm09 virus infection were similar to what has been
described in the region and internationally. The outbreak helped
to identify gaps in the incipient national influenza surveillance
system. The lessons learned from the outbreak response also
included the need to expand laboratory capacity to manage
increased demand for specimen testing during epidemics; and to
strengthen technical capacity at the district level to ensure the
successful decentralization of outbreak management. Additionally,
the quality of the integrated disease surveillance and response
(IDSR) system must be improved in order to provide reliable
surveillance data on current and future influenza outbreaks. Given
the importance of ISS as a surveillance backbone during the
pH1N1outbreak response, the system’s quality should be evaluat-
ed and improved to ensure timely detection of novel influenza
strains with pandemic potential, and for better understanding of
the epidemiology of seasonal influenza.
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